

# **United Kingdom ACC3 Scheme Guidance**

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## **Introduction to the UK ACC3 Scheme**

The UK ACC3 Scheme was established on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021 ensuring a continuing secure supply chain of UK-bound air cargo and mail shipments from certain non-EU countries, post-EU transition.<sup>1</sup>

Under the UK ACC3 Scheme, any air carrier flying cargo or mail from certain non-EU countries into the UK must hold a UK ACC3 designation for each relevant Last Point of Departure (LPD) airport. This guidance sets out the process for applying for a UK ACC3, RA3 or KC3 designation and describes the evidential requirements that will be taken into account in support of a decision on an application for UK designation.

In order to minimise disruption to industry and national authorities, carriers bringing cargo into the UK under an existing EU ACC3 designation will not immediately face any new requirements. Security controls for cargo and mail, including security screening requirements, will initially remain the same, as will the countries to which the UK ACC3 Scheme applies.

Carriers do not require ACC3 designations for flights from countries which are listed as exempt in the UK National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). Carriers with ‘Directed Party’ status in the UK are provided with a copy of the UK Single Consolidated Direction containing this information, which forms part of the NASP. The UK will at the outset retain the same list of exempt (“green”) countries as currently established under EU ACC3 regulations. In addition, all EU Member States, plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, will be added to the UK list of ACC3-exempt countries.

To ensure that secure cargo can fly to the UK from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021 without any additional impediment, the UK Government has issued UK ACC3 designations to all air carriers flying cargo into the UK holding EU ACC3 designations on the EU (Union) Database on Supply Chain Security as of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020. These UK ACC3 designations confer equivalent legal validity in respect of UK-bound operations to their existing EU designated status. Air carriers flying cargo into the UK from locations which are not currently exempted (i.e. which do not have “green” country status under the EU regulations) have been notified by the CAA of their UK ACC3 designations and the new arrangements.

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<sup>1</sup> The UK ACC3 Scheme is established as a result of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 retaining relevant parts of EU legislation through appropriate amendments via The Aviation Security (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, and supplemented by the Single Consolidated Direction 1/2021.

The UK has also issued UK RA3 and UK KC3 designations to all non-EU cargo handling and consigning entities holding existing EU designations on 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020 where these are required under current arrangements and in line with their current validity. For clarity, RA3s are non-EU Regulated Agents or Ground Handling Agents performing security controls for cargo and mail, while KC3s are non-EU Known Consignors (originators of goods, secured at source). This ensures that these already established secure supply chain entities are able to continue to work in partnership with air carriers in respect of cargo bound for the UK.

Upon expiry of existing designations or in respect of new applications, air carriers (ACC3s) will need to apply to the UK for a new UK ACC3 designation in relation to UK-bound operations. UK-specific designations may also be sought in respect of RA3s or KC3s within the supply chain of UK-bound ACC3s. EU RA3 and KC3 designations, accompanied by EU Validation Reports, may be accepted in support of a UK-specific ACC3 application.

The new UK Supply Chain Security Database fulfils the same functions as the existing EU database and lists all UK ACC3, RA3 and KC3 designations. It is accessible via the following link: <https://securesupplychain.caa.co.uk>.

The UK database site was launched as 'live' on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2020 and took legal effect from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021.

UK ACC3 designations will be listed on the UK site only. From 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021, UK ACC3 designations will be the only legally valid approval means under which air carriers will be authorised to fly cargo and mail to the UK.

### **How to Apply/Validation Process**

For new applications or renewals of existing designations, applicants should apply to the CAA for designation under the UK ACC3 Scheme by submitting a completed UK ACC3 Validation Report, both in hard copy (with manuscript signatures, page numbering, etc) and in electronic version, using the address details provided later in this guidance.

Applicants should choose a UK-accredited validator in order to conduct the independent validation process, from the list published on the UK Supply Chain Security Database, link as follows: <https://securesupplychain.caa.co.uk/Validator>

The same process applies regarding new applications or renewals of existing RA3 or KC3 designations, in cases where a UK-specific RA3 or KC3 designation is sought.

A completed UK Validation Report comprises:

- The cargo security programme of the entity being validated<sup>2</sup>;
- Completed checklist (see annexes);
- Validator Independence Declaration; and

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<sup>2</sup> The CAA only needs the most up-to-date version of the airline's cargo security programme. If the CAA already possesses a copy of this, it does not need to be sent again with every new application.

- Declaration of Commitments.

Further details including templates of these documents (validator checklists and accompanying declarations) are available in the annexes to this guidance and at: <https://securesupplychain.caa.co.uk/Validator>

Where new UK ACC3 designation applications are relying on existing RA3/KC3 designations, a copy of the validation reports for the existing designations should also be submitted.

In order to minimise any additional burden on carriers flying cargo to the UK and EU, and for screening/originating entities (RA3s and KC3s) in the supply chains of carriers flying to the UK and EU, the UK will, at its discretion on a case-by-case basis, accept an equivalent EU Validation Report as evidence in support of a UK application. In such cases, this would allow the submission to the CAA of a 'desktop' Validation Report including a copy of an already completed and approved EU ACC3 Validation Report (and accompanying RA3/KC3 reports as appropriate), together with confirmation of a new EU-issued ACC3 designation. The evidence submitted will be considered, at the UK's discretion, under the same process as for a UK-specific validation, although the UK reserves the right to ask for additional information or reports, and will take into account the age of the EU reports submitted. This process is intended to avoid, or at least minimise, the need for two separate on-site validations and validation reports at the same LPD where both a UK and EU designation are sought simultaneously.

EU validation reports will only be considered as evidence if they meet the requirements of the UK ACC3 Scheme. Applicants wishing to take advantage of this approach should consult the CAA first for further guidance. EU validation documentation should, by default, be submitted securely in electronic copy, ideally using Egress encrypted secure communications (which the UK CAA can assist with).

Applicants wishing to renew existing designations must apply at least 40 working days prior to expiry of their current designations. We cannot guarantee to process reports received later than this deadline prior to the expiry date. Where an air carrier intends to submit an EU Validation Report in support of its UK application, it should plan the EU validation suitably in advance of expiry in order to avoid a lapse in its UK designation.

### **Independent Validators**

Independent validators for whom the UK is responsible for accrediting under the UK ACC3 Scheme may be contracted by an entity seeking UK ACC3, RA3 or KC3 designation in order that a UK validation may be undertaken.

There is clear benefit to industry if validators are able to be accredited under both the UK and EU ACC3 regimes. This would enable a single validation visit to be made in support of concurrent applications under both schemes, and may also help facilitate the consideration of EU Validation Reports under the UK scheme as supporting evidence applying the process described above.

Some UK validators are already accredited under both the UK and EU ACC3 regimes. On a reciprocal basis, existing EU validators may seek approval as a UK-accredited validator by submitting an application to the UK CAA. In order to process applications, the CAA will require the following evidence from the accrediting EU Member State (appropriate authority):

- Documentation demonstrating the basis on which the individual or legal entity has been approved as an EU aviation security validator.
- Verification that the applicant has successfully completed a background check.

If the UK appropriate authority is satisfied that the evidence submitted fulfils UK National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) requirements, the UK may approve the individual or entity as a UK-accredited validator for a period not exceeding that granted by the responsible EU appropriate authority. In such a case, the UK will accredit that person or entity under the UK ACC3 Scheme and ensure the listing of that validator on the UK Supply Chain Security Database, conferring UK validator legal status.

### **UK Validation Report Requirements**

The validation process under the UK ACC3 Scheme applying from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021 is the same as for the EU ACC3 regime.

As highlighted above, where carriers are seeking designations from both the EU and the UK, a designation recently issued under the EU ACC3 regime may also be submitted as evidence to the UK, together with the respective EU Validation Reports and a completed UK desktop Validation Report. In such cases, having assessed all the evidence available to it, the UK may determine that this provides sufficient evidence for a UK ACC3 designation to be granted. However, the UK reserves the right to request further information or a separate on-site validation should the evidence demand it. Factors affecting that decision may include the UK's current assessment of threat, vulnerability or risk associated with the location in question, and also the age of the supporting Validation Reports. The UK CAA will try to give advance notice as early in the assessment process as possible should a separate on-site validation be required, hence the advice earlier that applicants wishing to exercise this approach should consult the UK CAA first.

UK ACC3 Validation Reports must include a copy of the completed checklist set out in Annex A, B or C, depending on the type of entity being validated, signed by both the validator and carrier. A copy of the completed and signed Declaration of Commitments set out in Annex D, E or F, depending on the type of entity validated, must also be included in addition to a signed validator Independence Declaration as set out in Annex G. A copy of the completed report should also be sent to the validated entity.

The validation shall consist of:

- An examination of the air carrier or other entity's security programme to confirm its relevance and completeness in respect of all related points.

- Verification of the implementation of aviation security measures in respect of the relevant cargo operations by using the relevant checklist set out in Annex A, B or C of this document.

The UK aviation security validator's verification of the effective implementation of security controls must by default be based on an on-site evaluation of standards as part of the wider validation activity, at the airport or screening premises from which the air carrier or entity has relevant cargo operations, before UK ACC3, RA3 or KC3 designation may be granted for that LPD or entity.

If the UK aviation security validation establishes that one or more of the objectives listed in the checklist set out in Annex A have not been effectively implemented, the UK Government will not designate the air carrier as UK ACC3 for the relevant cargo operations without proof of the subsequent effective implementation of measures to rectify any identified deficiencies.

The UK Government may accept (on-site) RA3 Validation Reports as evidence in support of UK ACC3 applications, and these may also serve in place of a specific ACC3 on-site validation in cases where the RA3 carries out the entire cargo operation, including loading into the hold of the aircraft on behalf of the ACC3, and where the RA3 Validation Report covers all these activities. In these cases the ACC3 application may be subject to a 'desktop' (documentary) assessment only. Where the desktop option is being exercised, this must be requested in advance from the UK CAA. It will be subject to CAA/DfT discretion and is not guaranteed. An on-site validation may therefore still be required. Factors affecting the decision taken may include the UK's current assessment of threat, vulnerability or risk associated with the location in question and the age of the supporting RA3 Validation Reports.

Each designation issued by the UK will commence from the date it is entered on the UK database, which will be backdated to the final day of the validation of the entity recorded in the validation report checklist. Designations on the database will be valid for a maximum period of 5 years from the final day of the validation for ACC3s, and a maximum period of 3 years from that date for RA3s and KC3s.

### **Validator Guide to Completing the Checklists**

The checklists listed in the Annexes are split into 10, 11 or 13 parts. Listed below is a summary of the information that the UK CAA and DfT expect to see in a Validation Report accompanying any applications, in order for them to be considered for approval. Failure to supply any of this information may cause delay or require follow-up questioning. Please note that in addition to documentary evidence, photographic evidence can prove useful, but it must pertain to the specific validation visit documented and not prior validations.

#### **Identification of the Entity Validated and the Validator**

- For any application to be accepted, the dates of validation and the details of the validator and validated entity must be documented at the outset in the relevant part of the respective checklist.

### Organisation and Responsibilities of the ACC3 at the Airport

This part of the checklist should define organisational responsibilities and detail the security controls that are undertaken:

- Validated entities must not accept cargo or mail for carriage on a UK-bound aircraft unless the application of appropriate screening or other security controls in accordance with UK requirements is confirmed and accounted for by the carrier or by a UK or EU aviation security-validated Regulated Agent or by a UK or EU aviation security-validated Known Consignor. This information should be accurately and clearly documented in the report.
- The report should detail who is responsible for the application and oversight of the security controls, and how the entity ensures that these security controls remain compliant.
- Security controls shall consist of physical screening or other controls that are part of the secure supply chain process that reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in consignments flying to the UK.
- The report should detail how cargo or mail is protected after screening until loading onto an aircraft.

### Security Programme of the Validated Entity

The Validation Report should include details of the entity's security programme and whether or not it sufficiently documents the security procedures for cargo travelling to the UK. The validator must confirm in the report that the entity's security programme includes the following information where applicable:

- A description of measures for air cargo and mail;
- The procedures for acceptance;
- The standard of screening;
- The location of screening;
- Details of the screening equipment being used;
- Details of the operator or service provider;
- A list of any exemptions from security screening;
- How high risk cargo and mail is treated.

Details of any entity's participation in the up-stream secure supply chain should also be included in the respective security programmes.

### Staff Recruitment and Training

- The Validation Report should include details of the background check requirements that the entity's staff must undertake. This should include the level of check required for different job roles, where applicable, and details on what the background check entails. A background check, as a minimum, should include a check of a person's identity, employment history over the past five years and any

other security-related information relevant to assessing the person's suitability to implement a security control or to be assigned unescorted access to a Security Restricted Area. This should include, where permissible under national legislation/rules, a Criminal Records Check (CRC). The Validation Report should indicate who conducts the check, particularly if the CRC is undertaken by the State or a third party under local or national rules.

- The validator must also include information on the level of training that staff receive in order to demonstrate that they are competent in delivering aviation security controls. This should include information on how staff demonstrate or obtain the competencies required to perform their duties. In order to fulfil that objective, the Validation Report must demonstrate that the entity has a procedure in place to ensure that all staff (including permanent, temporary, agency staff, drivers, etc) with direct and unescorted access to air cargo or air mail to which security controls are being or have been applied, undergo initial and recurrent security training to the standard required of their job role (e.g. screener training for screeners and security awareness training for other operatives). The Validation Report should include details of the syllabus and modules of training, an outline of the content of each module and the examination requirements. The report should also contain details of the training entity and the trainer's eligibility or accredited status.

### Acceptance Procedures

- The validator must document the entity's air cargo acceptance procedures as set out in the checklists. This should include details of the person delivering consignments and whether that person has provided the correct identification and paperwork accompanying consignments, so the entity can accept them.
- The validator must also document how the entity establishes the security status of all consignments received (e.g. High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM), insecure or secure as applicable).
- The validator must document how the entity is able to ensure that the cargo has originated from a UK or EU-validated supply chain entity, such as an ACC3, RA3 or KC3, if that is the case. The report should include information about how the entity identifies under the acceptance arrangements cargo bound for the UK so that the appropriate security controls are verified as applying.
- The validator must also document how the entity identifies the origin or routing of cargo to ensure that it did not originate from or pass through a country from which UK-bound cargo is prohibited from carriage by air.

### Database

- In order for entities to assure and monitor relevant secure supply chains, they may need to verify the active status of entities up-stream in the supply chain (e.g. ACC3s, RA3s or KC3s). This should be done through respective quality assurance measures, which may include interrogating the UK and/or EU security supply chain databases, where applicable. The validator shall document this quality assurance process, including how entities, if necessary, maintain their

own audit trail or database giving the relevant information for each entity or person from which it directly accepts secure cargo or mail. The information should include the status of the entity involved (i.e. ACC3, RA3 or KC3), the company's details including their address and other contact details (including the contact details of the responsible manager for aviation security), the nature of the business and the company's Unique Alphanumeric Indicator (UAI) on the UK or EU database.

- When receiving air cargo or mail as secure from another UK or EU-validated entity, the entity being validated must check in the relevant database whether the entity's security status is listed as active. If an entity's security status is inactive, the validator must ensure that the entity has a process for identifying such air cargo as insecure and ensuring that it is screened appropriately.

### Screening

In respect of on-site validations, the validator **must observe** the entity screening cargo in an operational environment.

- The validator's assessment should include details of all equipment types used and processes employed in the screening of UK-bound cargo.
- The assessment should be based on a detailed observation of screening standards and the results of the observation should be documented and assessed in the Validation Report accordingly.
- The validator should document which entity is carrying out the screening and the screening methods that are used at that site.
- Where screening equipment is being used, the validator must note whether or not this is on the UK, ECAC or TSA lists of approved equipment. It should also be documented whether the equipment is being used in line with the manufacturers' CONOPS, including if test pieces (particularly in respect of x-ray machines) are used daily to calibrate the functionality of the equipment and whether or not the machine undergoes regular maintenance.
- The validator should explain whether the nature of the consignment is actively taken into consideration by the screeners in order to determine the most appropriate screening method.
- The validator should identify and articulate what access control and other measures (such as CCTV) are in place to protect and monitor the screening area.
- The validator should note and document whether any items are regularly transported into the UK that are exempt from screening and confirm whether these are consistent with UK exemptions criteria.

- The validator must note what the Quality Assurance (QA) and oversight processes of the entity are with regard to screening and other security controls, and how the entity ensures that standards are maintained.
- If Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD) are used as a screening method, the validator should use the UK ACC3 EDD Checklist Protocol & Guidance Document as a guide or comparator in providing detailed information on, and an assessment of, the EDD operation, including in relation to certification, testing, training and QA. This document/checklist is classified and is available securely on request from the UK CAA.
- The validator should give an overview of the volume and type(s) of cargo they have observed being screened, along with a clear indication in their opinion of the effectiveness of the screening applied.

### High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM)

- Determined through the validation exercise, the entity's security programme should include a statement confirming understanding of the definition of High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM), including processes for dealing with HRCM, particularly in respect of consignments with packaging showing signs of tampering or significant damage.
- The Validation Report should detail whether or not the entity accepts HRCM, and if the entity does, what the procedures are for determining HRCM and how staff understand which cargo is HRCM and the relevant security processes to employ.
- The validator must ensure that the entity is correctly documenting HRCM and that the necessary equipment is on-site to screen HRCM effectively. This includes assessing whether the equipment available for use could realistically screen (in an operational environment) the volume of UK-bound cargo handled under any necessary time pressures (e.g. is it possible in the validator's judgement for the entity to screen 100 boxes of clothes in 1 day using 1 ETD machine?).

### Protection

- The validator must document the security controls applied to ensure that secure air cargo is protected from tampering and unlawful interference. This should include a description of who is responsible for protecting secure air cargo, details of all the entities involved if there are more than one, what each entity's role is (e.g. protection in the warehouse, protection while loading, etc), and details of the suitability of individual personnel for the role.
- The validator should provide a judgement on whether or not the protection of air cargo is sufficiently robust to ensure there is no unlawful interference with screened/secure air cargo bound for the UK.

### Accompanying Documentation

- The validator must describe how the entity ensures that all cargo destined for the UK is accompanied by the correct security documentation.
- The documentation in relation to UK-bound cargo must specify clearly the content of the consignment, its security status (including the methods of screening the consignment), the unique identifier of the consignment (e.g. air waybill number) and the UAI number of the relevant entity/entities involved in the security supply chain process.

### Compliance Marking

- As well as documenting and analysing the information described in the previous sections of the checklist, the validator must determine whether what has been observed or documented during the on-site verification is fully consistent with the relevant parts of the entity's security programme setting out the security measures for UK-bound air cargo. In other words, the practical implementation of security controls observed "on the ground" during the validation visit must reflect what is documented (satisfactorily) in the entity's security programme. Taken together, a final compliance marking or score should be registered reflecting both elements.
- The validator must make an overall assessment on whether the security controls that were viewed meet the required regulatory standards for cargo to be carried to the UK.
- The Validation Report should record an appropriate compliance marking that is fully reflective of, and consistent with, the observations and other evidence documented in the report.
- The validator and entity should both include in the report any material evidence or comments they may have in addition to the information covered in the checklist.

### Consideration of Applications

All applications will be considered and evaluated by the UK CAA prior to the Department for Transport making a decision, taking account of advice and recommendations submitted by the UK CAA and any other relevant evidence. The UK aims to determine the outcome of applications within 40 working days following the date of receipt of the Validation Report and any accompanying documentation.

Air carriers, Regulated Agents/GHAs and Known Consignors are advised to plan their applications and validations well in advance. Planning should take into account the availability of validators and the time it may take to organise on-site visits, complete reports and collate all available evidence so as to ensure that reports and accompanying documentation can be submitted to the UK CAA at least 40 working days in advance of the expiry of existing designations (and ideally well before this).

## **Quality Assurance/Oversight and Reporting Responsibilities of the Validated Entity**

Carriers and other entities listed on the UK Supply Chain Security Database are responsible for maintaining validated standards at all times and must immediately report any significant changes in their operations or relevant security controls to the UK CAA. Any specific failures of security and/or significant breaches of security controls, including wider security incidents, must be reported to the UK CAA immediately. Failure to supply such information may lead to the suspension or termination of an entity's designation, and may also be taken into account in the consideration of any future application.

### **Contact Details**

Any queries relating to the UK ACC3 Scheme should be directed to the CAA using the e-mail addresses below, including information about ACC3 applications and applying electronically (please note that electronic applications should be sent using Egress encrypted communications due to the classification of completed reports):

[Acc3@avsec.caa.co.uk](mailto:Acc3@avsec.caa.co.uk)

For information and queries pertaining to the UK ACC3 database:

[secure.supplychain@avsec.caa.co.uk](mailto:secure.supplychain@avsec.caa.co.uk)

In addition to electronic copy, hard-copy validation reports and documentary evidence should be submitted by post to the following address:

**Civil Aviation Authority  
Aviation Security Regulation (UK ACC3 Scheme)  
5<sup>th</sup> Floor, 11 Westferry Circus  
Canary Wharf  
LONDON, E14 4HD**

**UK VALIDATION CHECKLIST FOR ACC3**

ACC3 (*Air cargo or mail carrier operating into the UK from a third country airport*) designation is the prerequisite for carrying air cargo or air mail into the UK.

ACC3 designation is in principle required for all flights carrying cargo or mail for transfer, transit or unloading at UK airports. The UK Department for Transport is responsible for the designation of all air carriers as ACC3. The designation is based on the security programme of an air carrier and on an on-site verification of the implementation in compliance with the objectives referred to in this validation checklist.

The checklist is the instrument to be used by the UK aviation security validator for assessing the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo or air mail by or under the responsibility of the ACC3 or an air carrier applying for ACC3 designation.

A validation report shall be delivered to the Civil Aviation Authority and to the validated entity within a maximum of one month after the on-site verification. Integral parts of the validation report shall be at least:

- the completed checklist signed by the UK aviation security validator and where applicable commented by the validated entity; and
- the declaration of commitments signed by the validated entity; and
- an independence declaration in respect of the entity validated signed by the UK aviation security validator.

The validation report must include clear page numbering, the date of the UK aviation security validation and initialling on each page by the validator and the validated entity in order to prove the integrity of the validation report. The validation report shall be drafted in English.

Part 3 — Security programme of the air carrier, Part 6 — Database, Part 7 — Screening and Part 8 — High risk cargo or mail (HRCM) shall be assessed against the requirements of Chapters 6.7 and 6.8 of the UK National Aviation Security Programme. For the other parts, baseline standards are the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the guidance material contained in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973-Restricted).

***Completion notes:***

- All applicable and relevant parts of the checklist must be completed, in accordance with the business model and operations of the entity being validated. Where no information is available, this must be explained.
- After each part, the UK aviation security validator must conclude if and to what extent the objectives of this part are met.

PART 1

**Identification of the entity validated and the validator**

1.1. Date(s) of validation	
<b>Use exact date format, such as 01.10.2012 to 02.10.2012</b>	
dd/mm/yyyy	
1.2. Date of previous validation and unique alphanumeric identifier (UAI) of the ACC3 where available	
dd/mm/yyyy	
UAI	
1.3. Aviation security validator information	
Name	
Company/Organisation/Authority	
UAI	
Email address	
Telephone number — including international codes	
1.4. Name of air carrier to be validated	
Name	
AOC (Air Operators Certificate) issued in (name of State):	
International Air Transport Association (IATA) code or International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) code if IATA code does not exist for. Specify which code applies.	
State responsible for designating air carrier as ACC3	
1.5. Details of third country airport location to be validated or cargo or mail facilities linked to it	
Name	
IATA or ICAO code for the airport	
Country	
1.6. Nature of air carrier's business — More than one business type may be applicable	
(a) passenger and cargo/mail carrier;	
(b) cargo and mail only carrier;	
(c) cargo only carrier;	
(d) mail only carrier;	
(e) integrator;	

(f) charter.	
1.7. Name and title of person responsible for third country air cargo or air mail security	
Name	
Job title	
Email address	
Telephone number — including international codes	
1.8. Address of the air carrier's main office at the airport being visited	
Number/Unit/Building/Airport	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	
State (where relevant)	
Country	
1.9. Address of the air carrier's main office, for example the corporate headquarters	
Number/Unit/Building/Airport	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	
State (where relevant)	
Country	

## PART 2

### **Organisation and responsibilities of the ACC3 at the airport**

Objective: No air cargo or mail shall be carried to the UK without being subject to security controls. Details of such controls are provided by the following Parts of this checklist. The ACC3 shall not accept cargo or mail for carriage on a UK-bound aircraft unless the application of screening or other security controls is confirmed and accounted for by a UK aviation security validated regulated agent, a UK aviation security validated known consignor or such consignments are subject to screening in accordance with the UK legislation.

The ACC3 shall have a process to ensure that appropriate security controls are applied to all UK bound air cargo and air mail unless it is exempted from screening in accordance with the UK legislation and that cargo or mail is protected thereafter until loading onto aircraft. Security controls shall consist of:

- physical screening which shall be of a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment, or
- other security controls which are part of a supply chain security process that reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment applied by UK aviation security validated regulated agents or known consignors.

2.1. Has the air carrier established a process to ensure that air cargo or air mail is submitted to appropriate security controls prior to being loaded onto a UK bound aircraft?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process	
2.2. Are the security controls applied by the air carrier or on its behalf by an entity covered under the air carrier's security programme?	
If YES, provide details	
If NO, which entities not covered by the air carrier's security programme apply security controls to air cargo or mail carried by this air carrier into the UK?	
Specify the nature of these entities and provide details: — private handling company;  — government regulated company;  — government screening facility or body;  — Other	
2.3. By which instruments and instructions (such as oversight, monitoring, and quality control) does the air carrier ensure that security controls are applied in the required manner by the above service providers?	
2.4. Is the air carrier able to request the appropriate security controls in case the screening is carried out by entities which are not covered by the air carrier's security programme, such as government facilities?	
YES or NO	
If NO, provide details	
2.5. By which instruments and instructions (such as oversight, monitoring, and quality control) does the air carrier ensure that security controls are applied in the required manner by such service providers?	
2.6. Has a regulated agent or known consignor programme for air cargo and mail been put in place in accordance with ICAO standards in the State of the airport at which the validation visit takes place?	
If YES, describe the elements of the programme and how it has been put in place	
2.7. Conclusions and general comments on the reliance, conclusiveness and robustness of the	

process.	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 3

**Security programme of the air carrier**

Objective: The ACC3 shall ensure that its security programme includes all the aviation security measures relevant and sufficient for air cargo and mail to be transported into the UK.

The security programme and associated documentation of the air carrier shall be the basis of security controls applied in compliance with the objective of this checklist. The air carrier may wish to consider passing its documentation to the UK aviation security validator in advance of the site visit to help acquaint him with the details of the locations to be visited.

Note: The following points shall be appropriately covered:

- (a) description of measures for air cargo and mail;
- (b) procedures for acceptance;
- (c) regulated agent scheme and criteria;
- (d) known consignor scheme and criteria;
- (e) standard of screening;
- (f) location of screening;
- (g) details of screening equipment;
- (h) details of operator or service provider;
- (i) list of exemptions from security screening;
- (j) treatment of high risk cargo and mail.

3.1. Air carrier security programme	
Date – use exact date format dd/mm/yyyy	
Version	
Has the programme been submitted to the UK Department for Transport at an earlier stage? If YES was it for ACC3 designation? Other purposes?	
3.2. Does the security programme cover sufficiently the elements of the list above?	
YES or NO	
If NO, describe why detailing the reasons	
3.3. Are the aviation security measures described by the security programme relevant and sufficient to secure UK bound air cargo or air mail according to the required standards?	
YES or NO	

If NO, describe why detailing the reasons	
3.4. Conclusion: Is the security programme conclusive, robust and complete?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

#### PART 4

##### **Staff recruitment and training**

Objective: The ACC3 shall assign responsible and competent staff to work in the field of securing air cargo or air mail. Staff with access to secured air cargo possess all the competencies required to perform their duties and are appropriately trained.

In order to fulfil that objective, the ACC3 shall have a procedure to ensure that all staff (such as permanent, temporary, agency staff, drivers) with direct and unescorted access to air cargo or air mail to which security controls are being or have been applied:

- have been subject to initial and recurrent background checks, which are at least in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the airport validated, and
- have completed initial and recurrent security training to be aware of their security responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the airport validated.

*Note:*

- A background check means a check of a person's identity and previous experience, including any criminal history and any other security-related information relevant to assessing the person's suitability to implement a security control or for unescorted access to a security restricted area (ICAO Annex 17 definition). This is in accordance with national legislation.

4.1. Is there a procedure ensuring that all staff with direct and unescorted access to secured air cargo or air mail is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?	
YES or NO	
If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.	
4.2. Does the background check include?	
— check of criminal records	
— Interviews	
— other (provide details)	

Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into account.	
4.3. Is there a procedure ensuring that the person responsible for the application and supervision of the implementation of security controls at the site is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?	
YES or NO	
If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.	
4.4. Does this procedure include?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— check of criminal records</li> <li>— Interviews</li> <li>— other (provide details)</li> </ul>	
Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into account.	
4.5. Do staff with direct and unescorted access to secured air cargo or air mail receive security training before being given access to secured air cargo or air mail?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the elements and duration of the training	
4.6. Do staff that accept, screen or protect air cargo or air mail receive specific job related training?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the elements and durations of training courses.	
4.7. Do staff referred to in points 4.5 and 4.6 receive recurrent training?	
YES or NO	
If YES, specify the elements and the frequency of the recurrent training	
4.8. Conclusion: do the measures concerning staff recruitment and training ensure that all staff with access to secured air cargo or air mail have been properly assigned and trained to a standard sufficient to be aware of their security responsibilities?	

YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 5

**Acceptance procedures**

Objective: The ACC3 shall have a procedure in place in order to assess and verify upon acceptance the security status of a consignment in respect of previous controls.

The procedure shall include the following elements:

- (a) confirmation that the entity delivering the consignment is listed as active in the UK database on supply chain security for the specified airport or site;
- (b) verification that the UK database unique alphanumeric identifier of the entity delivering the consignment is indicated on the accompanying documentation;
- (c) verification of whether the consignment is delivered by a person nominated by the UK aviation security validated regulated agent or known consignor as listed in the UK ACC3 database;
- (d) the person nominated shall correspond to the person tasked to deliver the air cargo or air mail to the air carrier. The person delivering the consignment to the air carrier shall present an identity card, passport, driving license or other document, which includes his or her photograph and which has been issued or is recognised by the national authority;
- (f) where applicable, verification of whether the consignment is presented with all the required security information (air waybill and security status information on paper or by electronic means, description of the consignment and unique identifier thereof, reasons for issuing the security status, means or methods of screening or grounds for exemption from screening) that corresponds to the air cargo and mail consignments being delivered;
- (g) verification of whether the consignment is free from any signs of tampering; and
- (h) verification of whether the consignment has to be treated as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM).

5.1. When directly accepting a consignment, does the air carrier establish whether it comes from a regulated agent or a known consignor recognised according to UK air cargo legislation and listed in the UK database on supply chain security and in the database kept by the air carrier?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the procedure	
5.2. Does the air carrier verify the indication of the UAI on the documentation accompanying consignments received from another ACC3, RA3 or KC3 and confirms the active status of the ACC3, RA3 or KC3 on the database on supply chain security?	
YES or NO	
5.3. Does the entity have a procedure to ensure that in case the documentation does not contain the UAI or the entity from which the cargo is received has no active status on the UK database on supply chain security, the consignment is treated as shipment coming from an unknown source?	
YES or NO	

5.4. When directly accepting a consignment, does the air carrier establish whether its destination is a UK airport?	
YES or NO — explain	
5.5. If YES — does the air carrier submit all cargo or mail to the same security controls when the destination is a UK airport?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the procedure	
5.6. When directly accepting a consignment, does the air carrier establish whether it is to be regarded as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM), including for consignments that are delivered by other modes of transport other than air?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how? Describe the procedure	
5.7. When accepting a secured consignment, does the air carrier establish whether it has been protected from unauthorised interference and/or tampering?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe (such as seals, locks).	
5.8. If the air carrier accepts transit air cargo or air mail at this location (cargo or mail that departs on the same aircraft it arrived on), does the air carrier establish on the basis of the given data whether or not further security controls need to be applied?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how is it established?	
If NO, what controls are applied to ensure security of UK bound cargo and mail?	
5.9. If the air carrier accepts transfer air cargo or air mail at this location (cargo or mail that departs on a different aircraft to the one it arrived on), does the air carrier establish on the basis of the given data whether or not further security controls need to be applied?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how is it established?	
If NO, what controls are applied to ensure security of UK bound cargo and mail?	
5.10. Is the person delivering secured known air cargo to the air carrier required to present an official identification document containing a photograph?	
YES or NO	
5.11. Conclusion: Are the acceptance procedures sufficient to establish whether air cargo or air mail comes from a secure supply chain or that it needs to be subjected to screening?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 6

**Database**

Objective: Where the ACC3 is not obliged to apply 100% screening to UK bound air cargo or air mail, the ACC3 shall ensure the cargo or mail comes from a UK aviation security validated entity designated by the UK Department for Transport as third country regulated agent (RA3) or third country known consignor (KC3) designated by itself or by a third country regulated agent.

For monitoring the security relevant audit trail the ACC3 shall verify the active status of the RA3 and KC3 on the UK database of supply chain security, and maintain a database giving the following information for each entity or person from which it directly accepts cargo or mail:

- the status of the involved entity (regulated agent or known consignor),
- the company details, including the bona fide business address,
- the nature of the business, excluding business sensitive information,
- contact details, including those of the person(s) responsible for security,
- the unique alphanumeric identifier attributed in the UK database on supply chain security.

When receiving air cargo or mail from a RA3 or KC3 the ACC3 shall check in the UK database whether the entity is listed as active. If the RA3 or KC3 status is not active the air cargo or air mail delivered by such entity shall be screened before loading.

6.1. When directly accepting a consignment, does the air carrier establish whether it comes from a regulated agent or a known consignor recognised according to UK air cargo legislation and listed in the UK database on supply chain security and in the database kept by the air carrier?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the procedure	
6.2. Does the air carrier maintain a database including, as appropriate, the details referred to above, of:	
— entities designated as third country regulated agent (RA3),	
— entities designated as third country known consignor (KC3),	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the database	
If NO, explain why	
6.3. Does staff accepting air cargo and air mail have easy access to the UK database on supply chain security and to the air carrier's database?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process	
6.4. Is the database updated in a regular manner as to provide reliable data to the staff accepting air cargo and air mail?	

YES or NO	
If NO, explain	
6.5. Conclusion: Does the air carrier maintain a database that ensures full transparency on its relation to entities from which it directly receives (screened or security controlled) cargo or mail for transport into the UK?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

## PART 7

### Screening

Objective: Where the ACC3 accepts cargo and mail from an entity which is not a UK aviation security validated entity or the cargo received has not been protected from unauthorised interference from the time security controls were applied, the ACC3 shall ensure the air cargo or air mail is screened before being loaded onto an aircraft. The ACC3 shall have a process to ensure that UK bound air cargo and air mail for transfer, transit or unloading at a UK airport are screened by the means or methods referred to in UK legislation to a standard sufficient reasonably to ensure that it contains no prohibited articles.

Where the ACC3 does not screen air cargo or air mail itself, it shall ensure that the appropriate screening is carried out according to UK requirements. Screening procedures shall include where appropriate the treatment of transfer and transit cargo and mail.

Where screening of air cargo or mail is performed by or on behalf of the appropriate authority in the third country, the ACC3 receiving such air cargo or air mail from the entity shall declare this fact in its security programme, and specify the way adequate screening is ensured.

7.1. Is screening applied by the air carrier or on its behalf by an entity covered under the air carrier's security programme?	
If YES, provide details. If applicable, provide details of the entity or entities covered under the air carrier's security programme: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— Name</li> <li>— site specific address</li> <li>— presence of AEO status, if applicable</li> </ul>	
If NO, which entities not covered by the air carrier's security programme apply screening to air cargo or mail carried by this air carrier into the	

<p>UK? Specify the nature of these entities and provide details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— private handling company</li>   <li>— government regulated company</li>   <li>— government screening facility or body</li>   <li>— Other</li> </ul>	
<p>7.2. Is the entity able to request the appropriate security controls in case the screening is carried out by one of the above entities?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If NO, provide details</p>	
<p>7.3. By which instruments and instructions (for example oversight, monitoring, and quality control) does the entity ensure that security controls are applied in the required manner by such service providers?</p>	
<p></p>	
<p>7.4. What methods of screening are used for air cargo and air mail?</p>	
<p>Specify, including details of equipment used for screening air cargo and air mail (such as manufacturer, type, software version, standard, serial number) for all the methods deployed</p>	
<p>7.5. Is the equipment or method (for example explosive detection dogs) used included in the most recent UK, European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the US compliance list?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If YES, provide details</p>	
<p>If NO, give details specifying the approval of the equipment and date thereof, as well as any indications that it complies with UK equipment standards</p>	
<p>7.6. Is the equipment used in accordance with the manufacturers' concept of operations (CONOPS) and is the equipment regularly tested and maintained?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If YES, describe the process</p>	
<p>7.7. In case EDDs are deployed, are they subjected to initial and recurrent training, approval and quality control process to a standard equivalent to the UK, EU or TSA requirements?</p>	

YES or NO	
If YES, describe the entire process and the related documentation supporting the assessment	
7.8. In case EDDs are used, is the screening process following a deployment methodology equivalent to UK, EU or TSA standards?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the entire process and the related documentation supporting the assessment	
7.9. Is the nature of the consignment taken into consideration during screening?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how it is ensured that the screening method selected is employed to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment	
7.10. Is there a process for the resolution of the alarm generated by the screening equipment?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process of resolving alarms to reasonably ensure the absence of prohibited articles.	
If NO, describe what happens to the consignment.	
7.11. Are any consignments exempt from security screening?	
YES or NO	
7.12. Are there any exemptions that do not comply with the UK list?	
YES or NO	
If YES, detail	
7.13. Is access to the screening area controlled to ensure that only authorised and trained staff is granted access?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
7.14. Is an established quality control or testing regime in place?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
7.15. Conclusion: Is air cargo or air mail screened by an appropriate means or methods to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that it contains no prohibited articles?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 8

**High risk cargo or mail**

Objective: Consignments which originate from or transfer in locations identified as high risk by the UK or which appear to have been significantly tampered with are to be considered as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM). Such consignments have to be screened in line with specific instructions. High risk origins and screening instructions are provided by the appropriate UK authority having designated the ACC3. The ACC3 shall have a procedure to ensure that UK bound HRCM is identified and subject to appropriate controls as defined in the UK legislation.

The ACC3 shall remain in contact with the appropriate authority responsible for the UK airports to which it carries cargo in order to have available the latest state of information on high risk origins.

The ACC3 shall apply the same measures, irrespective of whether it receives high risk cargo and mail from another air carrier or through other modes of transportation.

Note: HRCM cleared for carriage into the UK shall be issued the security status 'SHR', which means secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft in accordance with high risk requirements.

8.1. Does the air carrier staff responsible for performing security controls know which air cargo and mail is to be treated as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM)?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
8.2. Does the air carrier have procedures in place for the identification of HRCM?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
8.3. Is HRCM subject to HRCM screening procedures according to the UK legislation?	
YES or NO	
If NO, indicate procedures applied	
8.4. After screening, does the air carrier issue a security status declaration for SHR in the documentation accompanying the consignment?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how security status is issued and in which document	
8.5. Conclusion: Is the process put in place by the air carrier relevant and sufficient to ensure that all HRCM has been properly treated before loading?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

PART 9

**Protection**

Objective: The ACC3 shall have processes in place to ensure UK bound air cargo or air mail is protected from unauthorised interference from the point where security screening or other security controls are applied or from the point of acceptance after screening or security controls have been applied, until loading.

Protection can be provided by different means such as physical (for example barriers, locked rooms), human (for example patrols, trained staff) and technological (for example CCTV, intrusion alarm).

UK bound secured air cargo or mail should be separated from air cargo or mail which is not secured.

9.1. Is protection of secured air cargo and air mail applied by the air carrier or on its behalf by an entity covered under the air carrier's security programme?	
If YES, provide details	
If NO, which entities not covered by the air carrier's security programme apply protection measures to secured air cargo or mail carried by this air carrier into the UK? Specify the nature of these entities and provide details:	
— private handling company	
— government regulated company	
— government screening facility or body	
— Other	
9.2. Are security controls and protection in place to prevent tampering during the screening process?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
9.3. Are there processes in place to ensure UK bound air cargo or air mail to which security controls have been applied are protected from unauthorised interference from the time it has been secured until its loading?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how it is protected	
If NO, specify reasons	
9.4. Conclusions: Is the protection of consignments sufficiently robust to prevent unlawful interference?	
YES or NO	

If NO specify reason	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

PART 10

**Accompanying documentation**

Objective: The ACC3 shall ensure that the documentation accompanying a consignment to which the ACC3 has applied security controls (for example screening, protection), contains at least:

- (a) the unique alphanumeric identifier received from the UK Department for Transport; and
- (b) the unique identifier of the consignment, such as the number of the (house or master) air waybill, when applicable; and
- (c) the content of the consignment; and
- (d) the security status, indicated as follows:
  - ‘SPX’, which means secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft, or
  - ‘SCO’, which means secure for all-cargo and all-mail aircraft only, or
  - ‘SHR’, which means secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft in accordance with high risk requirements.

In the absence of a third country regulated agent, the security status declaration may be issued by the ACC3 or by the air carrier arriving from a third country exempted from the ACC3 regime.

If the security status is issued by the ACC3, the air carrier shall additionally indicate the reasons for issuing it, such as the means or method of screening used or the grounds for exempting the consignment from screening, using the standards adopted in the consignment security declaration scheme.

In the event that the security status and the accompanying documentation have been established by an upstream RA3 or by another ACC3, the ACC3 shall verify, during the acceptance process, that the above information is contained in the accompanying documentation.

The documentation accompanying the consignment may either be in the form of an air waybill, equivalent postal documentation or in a separate declaration, and either in an electronic format or in writing.

10.1. Does the air carrier ensure that appropriate accompanying documentation is established and include the information required in the UK NASP.	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the content of the documentation	
If NO, explain why and how the cargo or mail is treated as ‘secure’ by the air carrier if it is loaded onto an aircraft	
10.2. Does the documentation include the air carrier’s ACC3 unique alphanumeric identifier?	
YES or NO	
If NO, explain why	

10.3. Does the documentation specify the security status of the cargo and how this status was achieved?	
YES or NO	
Describe how this is specified	
10.4. Conclusion: Is the documentation process sufficient to ensure that cargo or mail is provided with proper accompanying documentation which specifies the correct security status and all required information?	
YES or NO	
If NO specify reason	
Comments from the air carrier	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 11

### Compliance

Objective: After assessing the ten previous Parts of this checklist, the UK aviation security validator has to conclude if its on-site verification corresponds with the content of the part of the air carrier security programme describing the measures for the UK bound air cargo or air mail and if the security controls sufficiently implements the objectives listed in this checklist.

Conclusions may comprise one of the following four possible main cases:

- (1) the air carrier security programme is compliant and the on-site verification confirms compliance with the objective of the checklist; or
- (2) the air carrier security programme is compliant but the on-site verification does not confirm compliance with the objective of the checklist; or
- (3) the air carrier security programme is non-compliant but the on-site verification confirms compliance with the objective of the checklist; or
- (4) the air carrier security programme is non-compliant and the on-site verification does not confirm compliance with the objective of the checklist.

11.1. General conclusion: Indicate the case closest to the situation validated	
1, 2, 3 or 4	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	
Comments from the air carrier	

Name of the validator:

Date:

Signature:



**UK VALIDATION CHECKLIST FOR THIRD COUNTRY UK AVIATION SECURITY VALIDATED REGULATED AGENTS**

Third country entities have the option to become part of an ACC3's (*Air cargo or mail carrier operating into the UK from a third country airport*) secure supply chain by seeking designation as a third country UK aviation security validated regulated agent (RA3). An RA3 is a cargo handling entity located in a third country that is validated and approved as such on the basis of a UK aviation security validation.

An RA3 shall ensure that security controls including screening where applicable have been applied to consignments bound for the UK and the consignments have been protected from unauthorised interference from the time that those security controls were applied and until the consignments are loaded onto an aircraft or are otherwise handed over to an ACC3 or other RA3.

The prerequisites for carrying air cargo or air mail into the UK are provided for in the UK NASP.

The checklist is the instrument to be used by the UK aviation security validator for assessing the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo or air mail by or under the responsibility of the entity seeking designation as a RA3.

A validation report shall be delivered to the UK Department for Transport and to the validated entity within a maximum of one month after the on-site verification. Integral parts of the validation report shall be at least:

- the completed checklist signed by the UK aviation security validator and where applicable commented by the validated entity; and
- the declaration of commitments signed by the validated entity; and
- an independence declaration in respect of the entity validated signed by the UK aviation security validator.

The validation report must include clear page numbering, the date of the UK aviation security validation and initialling on each page by the validator and the validated entity in order to prove the integrity of the validation report. .

The RA3 shall be able to use the report in its business relations with any ACC3 and where applicable, with any RA3.

The validation report shall be in English.

***Completion notes:***

- All applicable and relevant parts of the checklist must be completed, in accordance with the business model and operations of the entity being validated. Where no information is available, this must be explained.
- After each part, the UK aviation security validator shall conclude if and to what extent the objectives of this part are met.

## PART 1

**Identification of the entity validated and the validator**

1.1. Date(s) of validation	
Use exact date format, such as from 01.10.2012 to 02.10.2012	
dd/mm/yyyy	
1.2. Date of previous validation where applicable	
dd/mm/yyyy	
Previous RA3 registration number, where available	
AEO certificate or C-TPAT status or other certifications, where available	
1.3. Aviation security validator information	
Name	
Company/Organisation/Authority	
Unique alphanumeric identifier (UAI)	
E-mail address	
Telephone number – including international codes	
1.4. Name of entity	
Name	
Company number (for example, commercial register identification number, if applicable)	
Number/Unit/Building	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	
State (where relevant)	
Country	
P.O. Box address, if applicable	
1.5. Main address of organisation (if different from site to be validated)	
Number/Unit/Building	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	
State (where relevant)	
Country	
P.O. Box address, if applicable	
1.6. Nature of business – More than one business type may be applicable	
a) air cargo only	

b) air and other modes of transport	
c) freight forwarder with cargo premises	
d) freight forwarder without cargo premises	
e) handling agent	
f) others	
1.7. Does the applicant ...?	
a) receive cargo from another 3rd country regulated agent	
b) receive cargo from 3rd country known consignors	
c) receive exempted cargo	
d) screen cargo	
e) store cargo	
f) other, please specify	
1.8. Approximate number of employees on site	
Number	
1.9. Name and title of person responsible for third country air cargo or air mail security	
Name	
Job title	
E-mail address	
Telephone number – including international codes	

PART 2

**Organisation and responsibilities of the third country UK aviation security validated regulated agent**

Objective: No air cargo or air mail shall be carried to the UK without being subject to security controls. Cargo and mail delivered by an RA3 to an ACC3 or another RA3 may only be accepted as secure cargo or mail if such security controls are applied by the RA3. Details of such controls are provided in the following Parts of this checklist.

The RA3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that appropriate security controls are applied to all UK bound air cargo and air mail and that secure cargo or mail is protected until being transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3. Security controls shall consist of one of the following:

- (a) physical screening which shall be of a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment;
- (b) other security controls, part of a supply chain security process, that reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment and which have been applied by another RA3 or KC3 designated by the RA3.

2.1. Has the entity established a security programme?	
YES or NO	
If NO go directly to point 2.5.	
2.2. Entity security programme	
Date – use exact format dd/mm/yyyy	
Version	
Is the security programme submitted and/or approved by the appropriate authority of the state of the entity? If YES please describe the process.	
2.3. Does the security programme sufficiently cover the elements mentioned in parts 3 to 9 of the checklist?	
YES or NO	
If NO, describe why detailing the reasons	
2.4. Is the security programme conclusive, robust and complete?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify the reasons	
2.5. Has the entity established a process to ensure that air cargo or air mail is submitted to appropriate security controls before being transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process	
2.6. Has the entity a management system (such as instruments, instructions) in place to ensure that the required security controls are implemented?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the management system and explain if it is approved, checked or provided by the appropriate authority or another entity.	
If NO, explain how the entity ensures that security controls are applied in the required manner.	
2.7. Conclusions and general comments on the reliance, conclusiveness and robustness of the process.	

Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 3

**Staff recruitment and training**

Objective: To ensure the required security controls are applied, the RA3 shall assign responsible and competent staff to work in the field of securing air cargo or air mail. Staff with access to secured air cargo must possess all the competencies required to perform their duties and shall be appropriately trained.

To fulfil that objective, the RA3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that all staff (such as permanent, temporary, agency staff, drivers) with direct and unescorted access to air cargo or air mail to which security controls are being or have been applied:

- (a) have been subject to initial and recurrent background checks, which are at least in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the RA3 premises validated; and
- (b) have completed initial and recurrent security training to be aware of their security responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the RA3 premises validated.

*Note:*

- A background check means a check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including any criminal history and any other security-related information relevant to assessing the person’s suitability to implement a security control or for unescorted access to a security restricted area (ICAO Annex 17 definition). This is in accordance with national legislation.

3.1. Is there a procedure ensuring that all staff with direct and unescorted access to secured air cargo/air mail is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?	
YES or NO	
If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.	
3.2. Does this procedure include?	
- check of criminal records  - interviews  - other (provide details)	
Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into	

account.	
3.3. Is there a procedure ensuring that the person responsible for the application and supervision of the implementation of security controls at the site is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?	
YES or NO	
If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.	
3.4. Does this procedure include?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- check of criminal records</li> <li>- interviews</li> <li>- other (provide details)</li> </ul> <p>Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into account.</p>	
3.5. Do staff with direct and unescorted access to secured air cargo or air mail receive security training before being given access to secured air cargo or air mail?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the elements and duration of the training	
3.6. Do staff that accept, screen or protect air cargo or air mail receive specific job-related training?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the elements and durations of training courses.	
3.7. Do staff referred to in points 3.5 and 3.6 receive recurrent training?	
YES or NO	
If YES, specify the elements and the frequency of the recurrent training	
3.8. Conclusion: do the measures concerning staff recruitment and training ensure that all staff with access to secured air cargo or air mail have been properly recruited and trained to a standard sufficient to be aware of their security responsibilities?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 4

**Acceptance procedures**

Objective: The RA3 may receive cargo or mail from another RA3, a KC3, or from an unknown consignor. The RA3 shall have appropriate acceptance procedures for cargo and mail in place in order to establish whether a consignment comes from a secure supply chain or not and subsequently which security measures need to be applied to it.

When accepting any consignments, the RA3 shall establish the status of the entity from which it receives the consignments verifying whether or not the unique alphanumeric identifier (UAI) of the entity delivering the consignments is indicated on the accompanying documentation, and confirming that the air carrier or entity delivering the consignment is listed as active in the UK database on supply chain security for the specified airport or site, as appropriate.

If there is no indication of the UAI on the documentation or if the status of the air carrier or entity on the UK database on supply chain security is not active, the RA3 shall treat the consignments as arriving from an unknown source.

Additionally, a RA3 shall maintain a database giving at least the following information for each regulated agent or known consignor that has been subject to UK aviation security validation from which it directly accepts cargo or mail to be delivered to an ACC3 for carriage into the UK:

- (a) the company details, including the bona fide business address;
- (b) the nature of the business, excluding business sensitive information;
- (c) contact details, including those of the person(s) responsible for security;
- (d) the company registration number, if applicable;
- (e) where available, the validation report;
- (f) the unique alphanumeric identifier attributed in the UK database on supply chain security.

4.1. When accepting a consignment, does the entity establish whether it comes from another RA3, a KC3, or an unknown consignor?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how?	
4.2. Does the entity verify the indication of the UAI on the documentation accompanying consignments received from another ACC3, RA3 or KC3 and confirms the active status of the ACC3, RA3 or KC3 on the UK database on supply chain security?	
YES or NO	
4.3. Does the entity have a procedure to ensure that in case the documentation does not contain the UAI or the entity from which the cargo is received has no active status on the UK database on supply chain security, the consignment is treated as shipment coming from an unknown source?	
YES or NO	
4.4. When accepting a consignment, does the entity establish whether its destination is a UK airport?	
YES or NO – explain	

4.5. If YES – does the entity submit all air cargo or air mail to the same security controls when the destination is a UK airport?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the procedure	
4.6. When accepting a consignment, does the entity establish whether it is to be regarded as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM) (see definition in Part 6), including for consignments that are delivered by other modes of transport than by air?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how?	
Describe the procedure	
4.7. When accepting a secured consignment, does the validated entity establish whether it has been protected from unauthorised interference or tampering?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe by which means (for example, using seals, locks, inspection)	
4.8. Is the person making the delivery required to present an official identification document containing a photo?	
YES or NO	
4.9. Is there a process in place to identify consignments that require screening?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how?	
4.10. Conclusion: Are the acceptance procedures sufficient to establish that air cargo or air mail to a UK airport destination comes from a secure supply chain or needs to be subject to screening?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 5

### Screening

Objective: Where the RA3 accepts cargo and mail which does not come from a secure supply chain, the RA3 needs to subject these consignments to appropriate screening before it may be delivered to an ACC3 as secure cargo. The RA3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that UK bound air cargo and air mail for transfer, transit or unloading at a UK airport is screened by the means or methods referred to in UK legislation to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that it contains no prohibited articles.

Where screening of air cargo or air mail is performed by or on behalf of the appropriate authority in the third country, the RA3 shall declare this fact and specify the way adequate screening is ensured.

5.1. Is screening applied on behalf of the entity by another entity?
--

YES or NO	
<p>If YES, Specify the nature of these entities and provide details:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— private screening company;</li> <li>— government regulated company;</li> <li>— government screening facility or body;</li> <li>— other</li> </ul> <p>Specify the nature of the agreement or contract between the validated entity and the entity that applies the screening on its behalf.</p>	
5.2. Is the entity able to request the appropriate security controls in case the screening is carried out by one of the above entities?	
YES or NO	
If NO, provide details	
5.3. By which instruments and instructions (such as oversight, monitoring, and quality control) does the entity ensure that security controls are applied in the required manner by such service providers?	
5.4. What methods of screening are used for air cargo and mail?	
Specify, including details of equipment used for screening air cargo and air mail (such as manufacturer, type, software version, standard, serial number) for all the methods deployed.	
5.5. Is the equipment or method (such as explosive detection dogs) used included in the most recent UK, European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the US compliance list?	
YES or NO	
If YES, provide details	
If NO, give details specifying the approval of the equipment and date thereof, as well as any indications that it complies with UK equipment standards.	
5.6. Is the equipment used in accordance with the manufacturers' concept of operations (CONOPS) and is the equipment regularly tested and maintained?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process	

5.7. In case EDDs are deployed, are they subjected to initial and recurrent training, approval and quality control process to a standard equivalent to the UK or TSA requirements?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the entire process and the related documentation supporting the assessment	
5.8. In case EDDs are used, is the screening process following a deployment methodology equivalent to UK or TSA standards?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the entire process and the related documentation supporting the assessment	
5.9. Is the nature of the consignment taken into consideration during screening?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how it is ensured that the screening method selected is employed to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment.	
5.10. Is there a process for the resolution of the alarm generated by the screening equipment? For some equipment, such as x-ray equipment, the alarm is triggered by the operator himself.	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process of resolving alarms to reasonably ensure the absence of prohibited articles.	
If NO, describe what happens to the consignment	
5.11. Are any consignments exempt from security screening?	
YES or NO	
5.12. Are there any exemptions that do not comply with the UK list?	
YES or NO	
If YES, detail	
5.13. Is access to the screening area controlled to ensure that only authorised and trained staff are granted access?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
5.14. Is an established quality control and/or testing regime in place?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
5.15. Conclusion: Is air cargo or air mail screened by one of the means or methods listed to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that it contains no prohibited articles?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	

Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 6

**High Risk Cargo or Mail**

Objective: Consignments which originate from or transfer in locations identified as high risk by the UK or which appear to have been significantly tampered with are to be considered as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM). Such consignments have to be screened in line with specific instructions. The RA3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that UK bound HRCM is identified and subject to appropriate controls as defined in the UK legislation.

The ACC3 to which the RA3 delivers air cargo or mail for transportation shall be authorised to inform the RA3 about the latest state of relevant information on high risk origins.

The RA3 shall apply the same measures, irrespective of whether it receives high risk cargo and mail from an air carrier or through other modes of transportation.

Note: HRCM cleared for carriage into the UK shall be issued the security status ‘SHR’, meaning secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft in accordance with high risk requirements.

6.1. Do staff responsible for performing security controls know which air cargo and mail is to be treated as high risk cargo and mail (HRCM)?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
6.2. Does the entity have procedures in place for the identification of HRCM?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
6.3. Is HRCM subject to HRCM screening procedures according to UK legislation?	
YES or NO	
If NO, indicate procedures applied	
6.4. After screening, does the entity issue a security status declaration for SHR in the documentation accompanying the consignment?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how security status is issued and in which document	
6.5. Conclusion: Is the process put in place by the entity relevant and sufficient to ensure that all HRCM has been properly treated before loading?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

PART 7

**Protection of secured air cargo and mail**

Objective: The RA3 shall have procedures in place to ensure UK bound air cargo and/or air mail is protected from unauthorised interference and/or any tampering from the point where security screening or other security controls are applied or from the point of acceptance after screening or security controls have been applied, until loading or transferring to an ACC3 or another RA3. If previously secured air cargo and mail is not protected afterwards, it may not be loaded or transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

Protection can be provided by different means such as physical (for example barriers, locked rooms), human (for example patrols, trained staff) and technological (for example CCTV, intrusion alarm).

UK bound secured air cargo or mail should be separated from air cargo or mail which is not secured.

7.1. Is protection of secured air cargo and air mail applied on behalf of the validated entity by another entity?	
YES or NO	
<p>If YES, Specify the nature of these entities and provide details:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— private screening company;</li> <li>— government regulated company;</li> <li>— government screening facility or body;</li> <li>— other</li> </ul>	
7.2. Are security controls and protection in place to prevent tampering during the screening process?	
YES or NO	
<p>If YES, describe Specify what kind(s) of protection(s) are put in place:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— physical (for example fence, barrier, building of solid construction),</li> <li>— human (for example patrols etc.),</li> <li>— technological (for example CCTV, alarm system).</li> </ul> <p>Explain how they are organised.</p>	
7.3. Is the secure air cargo/air mail only accessible to authorised persons?	

YES or NO	
If YES, describe Specify how all access points (including doors and windows) to identifiable and secured air cargo or air mail are controlled.	
7.4. Are there procedures in place to ensure UK bound air cargo or air mail to which security controls have been applied are protected from unauthorised interference from the time it has been secured until its loading or is transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe how it is protected (for example by physical, human, technological means) Specify also if the building is of solid construction and what kinds of materials are used, if available.	
If NO, specify reasons	
7.5. Conclusion: Is the protection of consignments sufficiently robust to prevent unlawful interference?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 8

### Documentation

Objective: The RA3 shall ensure that the documentation accompanying a consignment to which the RA3 has applied security controls (such as screening, protection), contains at least:

- (a) the unique alphanumeric identifier received from the UK Department for Transport; and
- (b) the unique identifier of the consignment, such as the number of the (house or master) air waybill, when applicable; and
- (c) the content of the consignment; and
- (d) the security status, indicated as follows:

— ‘SPX’, which means secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft, or

— ‘SCO’, which means secure for all-cargo and all-mail aircraft only, or

— ‘SHR’, which means secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft in accordance with high risk requirements.

If the security status is issued by the RA3, the entity shall additionally indicate the reasons for issuing it, such as the means or method of screening used or the grounds for exempting the consignment from screening, using the standards adopted in the Consignment Security Declaration scheme.

The documentation accompanying the consignment may either be in the form of an air waybill, equivalent postal documentation or in a separate declaration, and either in an electronic format or in writing.

8.1. Does the entity ensure that appropriate accompanying documentation is established, and include the information required?	
YES or NO	
If NO, explain	
8.2. In particular, does the entity specify the status of the cargo and how this was achieved?	
YES or NO	
If NO, explain	
8.3. Conclusion: Is the documentation process sufficient to ensure that cargo or mail is provided with proper accompanying documentation which specifies the correct security status and all required information?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 9

### Transportation

Objective: Air cargo and air mail must be protected from unauthorised interference or tampering from the time it has been secured until its loading or until it is transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3. This includes protection during transportation to the aircraft, to the ACC3 or to another RA3. If previously secured air cargo and mail is not protected during transportation, it may not be loaded or transferred to an ACC3 or another RA3 as secure cargo.

During transportation to an aircraft, an ACC3 or another RA3, the RA3 is responsible for the protection of the secure consignments. This includes cases where the transportation is undertaken by another entity, such as a freight forwarder, on its behalf. This does not include cases whereby the consignments are transported under the responsibility of an ACC3 or another RA3.

9.1. How is the air cargo or air mail conveyed to the ACC3 or to another RA3?	
(a) Validated entity's own transport?	
YES or NO	
(b) Other RA3's or ACC3's transport?	
YES or NO	
(c) Contractor used by the validated entity?	
YES or NO	
9.2. Is the air cargo or air mail tamper evidently packed?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how	
9.3. Is the vehicle sealed or locked before transportation?	
YES or NO	

If YES, how	
9.4. Where numbered seals are used, is access to the seals controlled and are the numbers recorded?	
YES or NO	
If YES, specify how	
9.5. If applicable, does the respective haulier sign the haulier declaration?	
YES or NO	
9.6. Has the person transporting the cargo been subject to specific security controls and awareness training before being authorised to transport secured air cargo or air mail, or both?	
YES or NO	
If YES, please describe what kind of security controls (such as pre-employment check, background check) and what kind of training (such as security awareness training).	
9.7. Conclusion: Are the measures sufficient to protect air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference during transportation?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 10

### Compliance

Objective: After assessing Parts 1 to 9 of this checklist, the UK aviation security validator has to conclude if its on-site verification confirms the implementation of the security controls in compliance with the objectives listed in this checklist for the UK bound air cargo or air mail.

Two different scenarios are possible. The UK aviation security validator concludes that the entity:

1. has succeeded in complying with the objectives referred to in this checklist. A validation report shall be delivered to the UK Civil Aviation Authority and to the validated entity within a maximum of one month after the on-site verification;
2. has failed in complying with the objectives referred to in this checklist. In that case, the entity is not authorised to deliver secured air cargo or mail for UK destination to an ACC3 or to another RA3. It shall receive a copy of the completed checklist stating the deficiencies.

10.1. General conclusion: Indicate the case closest to the situation validated	
1 or 2	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	
Comments from the entity	

Name of the validator:

Date:

Signature:



**VALIDATION CHECKLIST FOR THIRD COUNTRY UK AVIATION SECURITY**  
**VALIDATED KNOWN CONSIGNOR**

Third country entities have the option to become part of an ACC3's (*Air cargo or mail carrier operating into the UK from a third country airport*) secure supply chain by seeking designation as a third country UK aviation security validated known consignor (KC3). A KC3 is a cargo handling entity located in a third country that is validated and approved as such on the basis of a UK aviation security validation.

A (KC3) shall ensure that security controls have been applied to consignments bound for the UK and the consignments have been protected from unauthorised interference from the time that those security controls were applied and until transferring to an ACC3 or a third country UK aviation security validated regulated agent (RA3).

The checklist is the instrument to be used by the UK aviation security validator for assessing the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo or air mail by or under the responsibility of the entity seeking designation as a KC3.

A validation report shall be delivered to the UK Department for Transport and to the validated entity within a maximum of one month after the on-site verification. Integral parts of the validation report shall be at least the following:

- the completed checklist signed by the UK aviation security validator and where applicable commented by the validated entity; and
- the declaration of commitments signed by the validated entity; and
- an independence declaration in respect of the entity validated signed by the UK aviation security validator.

The validation report must include clear page numbering, the date of the UK aviation security validation and initialling on each page by the validator and the validated entity in order to prove the integrity of the validation report. The KC3 shall be able to use the report in its business relations with any ACC3 and any RA3.

By default the validation report shall be in English.

***Completion notes:***

- (1) All applicable and relevant parts of the checklist must be completed, in accordance with the business model and operations of the entity being validated. Where no information is available, this must be explained.
- (2) After each part, the UK aviation security validator shall conclude if and to what extent the objectives of this part are met.

### Organisation and responsibilities

1.1. Date(s) of validation	
Use exact date format, such as from 01.10.2012 to 02.10.2012	
dd/mm/yyyy	
1.2. Date of previous validation where applicable.	
dd/mm/yyyy	
Previous KC3 registration number, where available	
AEO certificate or C-TPAT status or other certifications, where available	
1.3. Aviation security validator information	
Name	
Company/Organisation/Authority	
Unique alphanumeric identifier (UAI)	
E-mail address	
Telephone number – including international codes	
1.4. Name of entity	
Name	
Company number (for example commercial register identification number, if applicable)	
Number/Unit/Building	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	
State (where relevant)	
Country	
P.O. Box address, if applicable	
1.5. Main address of organisation (if different from site to be validated)	
Number/Unit/Building	
Street	
Town	
Postcode	

State (where relevant)	
Country	
P.O. Box address, if applicable	
1.6. Nature of business – Types of cargo processed	
What is the nature of business, e.g. type of cargo processed in the applicant's premises?	
1.7. Is the applicant responsible for...?	
a) production b) packing c) storage d) despatch e) other, please specify	
1.8. Approximate number of employees on site	
Number	
1.9. Name and title of person responsible for third country air cargo or air mail security	
Name	
Job title	
E-mail address	
Telephone number – including international codes	

## PART 2

### **Organisation and responsibilities of the third country UK aviation security validated known consignor**

Objective: No air cargo or air mail shall be carried to the UK without being subject to security controls. Cargo and mail delivered by a KC3 to an ACC3 or RA3 may only be accepted as secure cargo or mail if such security controls are applied by the KC3. Details of such controls are provided by the following Parts of this checklist.

The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that appropriate security controls are applied to all UK bound air cargo and air mail and that secure cargo or mail is protected until being transferred to an ACC3 or a RA3. Security controls reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the consignment.

2.1. Has the entity established a security programme?	
YES or NO	

If NO, go directly to point 2.5	
2.2. Entity security programme information	
Date – use exact format dd/mm/yyyy	
Version	
Is the security programme submitted to or approved by the appropriate authority of the state in which the entity is located? If YES, please describe the process.	
2.3. Does the security programme sufficiently cover the elements mentioned in parts 4 to 11 of the checklist?	
YES or NO	
If NO, describe why, detailing the reasons	
2.4. Is the security programme conclusive, robust and complete?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify the reasons	
2.5. Has the entity established a process to ensure that UK bound air cargo or air mail is submitted to appropriate security controls before being transferred to an ACC3 or an RA3?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the process	
2.6. Has the entity a management system (for example instruments, instructions) in place to ensure that the required security controls are implemented?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe the management system and explain if it is approved, checked or provided by the appropriate authority or other entity.	
If NO, explain how the entity ensures that security controls are applied in the required manner.	
2.7. Conclusions and general comments on the reliance, conclusiveness and robustness of the process.	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

### Identifiable air cargo or air mail

Objective: To establish the point or place where cargo or mail becomes identifiable as air cargo or air mail.

3.1. By inspection of the production, packing, storage, selection, despatch and any other relevant areas, ascertain where and how a consignment of UK bound air cargo or air mail becomes identifiable as such.	
Describe	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

Please note that detailed information should be given on the protection of identifiable air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering in Parts 6 to 9.

### PART 4

#### Staff recruitment and training

Objective: In order to ensure that the required security controls are applied, the KC3 shall assign responsible and competent staff to work in the field of securing air cargo or air mail. Staff with access to identifiable air cargo shall possess all the competencies required to perform their duties and be appropriately trained.

In order to fulfil that objective, the KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that all staff (such as permanent, temporary, agency staff, drivers) with direct and unescorted access to air cargo or air mail to which security controls are being or have been applied:

- (a) have been subject to initial and recurrent background checks, which are at least in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the KC3 premises validated; and
- (b) have completed initial and recurrent security training to be aware of their security responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of the local authorities of the KC3 premises validated.

*Note:*

- A background check means a check of a person's identity and previous experience, including any criminal history and any other security-related information relevant to assessing the person's suitability to implement a security control or for unescorted access to a security restricted area (ICAO Annex 17 definition). This is in accordance with national legislation.

4.1. Is there a procedure ensuring that all staff with access to identifiable air cargo or air mail is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?	
YES or NO	
If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.	
4.2. Does this procedure include?	
- check of criminal records	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- interviews</li> <li>-</li> <li>other (provide details)</li> </ul> <p>Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into account.</p>	
<p>4.3. Is there a procedure ensuring that the person responsible for the application and supervision of the implementation of security controls at the site is subject to a check that assesses background and competence?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If YES, indicate the number of preceding years taken into account for the background check and state which entity carries it out.</p>	
<p>4.4. Does this procedure include?</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- check of criminal records</li> <li>- interviews</li> <li>- other (provide details)</li> </ul> <p>Explain the elements, indicate which entity carries this element out and where applicable, indicate the preceding timeframe that is taken into account.</p>	
<p>4.5. Do staff with access to identifiable air cargo/air mail receive training before being given access to identifiable air cargo or air mail?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If YES, describe the elements and duration of the training</p>	
<p>4.6. Do staff referred to in point 4.5 receive recurrent training?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If YES, specify the elements and the frequency of the recurrent training</p>	
<p>4.7. Conclusion: do measures concerning staff recruitment and training ensure that all staff with access to identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail have been properly recruited and trained to a standard sufficient to be aware of their security responsibilities?</p>	
<p>YES or NO</p>	
<p>If NO, specify reasons</p>	

Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 5

**Physical security**

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it cannot be forwarded to an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

The entity has to demonstrate how its site or its premises are protected and that relevant access control procedures are in place. It is essential that access to the area where identifiable air cargo or air mail is processed or stored, is controlled. All doors, windows and other points of access to secure UK bound air cargo or air mail need to be secured or subject to access control.

Physical security can be, but is not limited to:

- physical obstacles such as fencing or barriers,
- technology using alarms and/or CCTV systems,
- human security such as staff dedicated to carry out surveillance activities.

5.1. Are all access points to identifiable air cargo/air mail subject to access control and is access limited to authorised persons?	
YES or NO	
<p>If YES, how is access controlled? Explain and describe. Multiple answers may be possible.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> by security staff</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> by other staff</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> manual checking if persons are allowed to enter the area</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> electronic access control systems</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> other, specify</p>	
<p>If YES, how is it ensured that a person is authorised to enter the area? Explain and describe. Multiple answers may be possible.</p> <p>— use of a company identification card</p> <p>— use of another type of identification card such as passport or driver's licence</p> <p>— list of authorised persons used by (security) staff</p> <p>— electronic authorisation, e.g. by use of a chip;</p> <p>— distribution of keys or access codes only to</p>	

authorised personnel	
— other, specify	
5.2. Are all access points to identifiable air cargo or air mail secured? This includes access points which are not permanent in use and points which are normally not used as access points, such as windows.	
YES or NO	
If YES, how are these points secured? Explain and describe. Multiple answers may be possible.	
— presence of security staff	
— electronic access control systems which allow access to one person at a time	
— barriers, for example shutters or locks	
— CCTV system	
— intruder detection system	
5.3. Are there additional measures to enhance the security of the premises in general?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain and describe what they are	
<input type="checkbox"/> fencing or barriers	
<input type="checkbox"/> CCTV system	
<input type="checkbox"/> intruder detection system	
<input type="checkbox"/> surveillance and patrols	
<input type="checkbox"/> other, specify	
5.4. Is the building of solid construction?	
YES or NO	
5.5. Conclusion: Are the measures taken by the entity sufficient to prevent unauthorised access to those parts of the site and premises where identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail is processed or stored?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 6

**Production**

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering during the production process. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it cannot be forwarded to an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

The entity has to demonstrate that access to the production area is controlled and the production process is supervised. If the product becomes identifiable as UK bound air cargo or air mail in the course of production, the entity has to show that measures are taken to protect air or cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering from this stage.

*Answer these questions where the product can be identified as UK bound air cargo/air mail in the course of the production process.*

6.1. Is access to the production area controlled and limited to authorised persons?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how the access is controlled and limited to authorised persons	
6.2. Is the production process supervised?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how it is supervised	
6.3. Are controls in place to prevent tampering at the stage of production?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
6.4. Conclusion: Are measures taken by the entity sufficient to protect identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering during production?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

## PART 7

### Packing

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering during the packing process. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it cannot be forwarded to an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

The entity has to demonstrate that access to the packing area is controlled and the packing process is supervised. If the product becomes identifiable as UK bound air cargo or air mail in the course of packing, the entity has to show that measures are taken to protect air cargo/air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering from this stage. All finished goods need to be checked prior to packing.

*Answer these questions where the product can be identified as UK bound air cargo/air mail in the course of the packing process.*

7.1. Is access to the packing area controlled and limited to authorised persons?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how the access is controlled and limited to authorised persons	
7.2. Is the packing process supervised?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how it is supervised	
7.3. Are controls in place to prevent tampering at the stage of packing?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
7.4. Describe the finished outer packaging:	
(a) Is the finished outer packing robust?	
YES or NO	
Describe	
(b) Is the finished outer packaging tamper evident?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe which process is used to make the packaging tamper evident, for example by use of numbered seals, special stamps or security tape.	
If NO, describe what protection measures that ensure the integrity of the consignments are taken.	
7.5. Conclusion: Are measures taken by the entity sufficient to protect identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering during packing?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 8

**Storage**

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering during storage. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it cannot be forwarded to an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail. The entity has to demonstrate that access to the storage area is controlled. If the product becomes identifiable as UK bound air cargo or air mail while being stored, the entity has to show that measures are taken to protect air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering as from this stage.

*Answer these questions where the product can be identified as UK bound air cargo/air mail in the course of the storage process.*

8.1. Is access to the storage area controlled and limited to authorised persons?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how the access is controlled and limited to authorised persons	
8.2. Is the finished and packed air cargo or air mail stored securely and checked for tampering?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
If NO, explain how the entity ensures that the finished and packed UK bound air cargo and air mail is protected against unauthorised interference and any tampering.	
8.3. Conclusion: Are measures taken by the entity sufficient to protect identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering during storage?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

PART 9

**Despatch**

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering during the despatch process. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it must not be forwarded to an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

The entity has to demonstrate that access to the despatch area is controlled. If the product becomes identifiable as UK bound air cargo or air mail in the course of despatch, the entity has to show that measures are taken to protect air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering from this stage.

Answer these questions where the product can be identified as UK bound air cargo or air mail in the course of the despatch process.

9.1. Is access to the despatch area controlled and limited to authorised persons?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how the access is controlled and limited to authorised persons	
9.2. Who has access to the despatch area? Multiple answers may be possible.	
<input type="checkbox"/> employees of the entity	
<input type="checkbox"/> drivers	
<input type="checkbox"/> visitors	
<input type="checkbox"/> contractors	
<input type="checkbox"/> others, specify	
9.3. Is the despatch process supervised?	
YES or NO	
If YES, explain how it is supervised	
9.4. Are controls in place to prevent tampering in the despatch area?	
YES or NO	
If YES, describe	
9.5. Conclusion: Are measures taken by the entity sufficient to protect identifiable UK bound air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference or tampering during the despatch process?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

## PART 10

### Consignments from other sources

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place to ensure that cargo or mail which it has not originated itself, shall not be forwarded to an ACC3 or an RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

A KC3 may pass consignments which it has not itself originated to a RA3 or an ACC3, provided that following conditions are met:

(a) they are separated from consignments which it has originated; and

(b) the origin is clearly indicated on the consignment or an accompanying documentation.

All such consignments must be screened by an RA3 or ACC3 before they are loaded onto an aircraft.

10.1. Does the entity accept consignments of cargo or mail intended for carriage by air from any other entity?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how are these consignments kept separate	

from the company's own cargo or mail and how are they identified to the regulated agent or haulier?	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator.	

## PART 11

### Documentation

Objective: The KC3 shall ensure that the documentation accompanying a consignment to which the KC3 has applied security controls (for example protection), contains at least:

- (a) the unique alphanumeric identifier received from the UK Department for Transport; and
- (b) the content of the consignment.

The documentation accompanying the consignment may either be in an electronic format or in writing.

11.1. Does the entity ensure that appropriate accompanying documentation is established, containing the UAI received from the UK Department for Transport and a description of the consignment?	
YES or NO	
If NO, explain	
11.2. Conclusion: Is the documentation process sufficient to ensure that cargo or mail is provided with proper accompanying documentation?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reason	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	

## PART 12

### Transportation

Objective: The KC3 shall have procedures in place in order to ensure identifiable air cargo or air mail bound for the UK is protected from unauthorised interference or any tampering during transportation. If such cargo or mail is not protected, it must not be accepted by an ACC3 or RA3 as secure cargo or mail.

During transportation, the KC3 is responsible for the protection of the secure consignments. This includes cases where the transportation is undertaken by another entity, such as a freight forwarder, on its behalf. This does not include cases whereby the consignments are transported under the responsibility of an ACC3 or RA3.

Answer these questions where the product can be identified as UK bound air cargo or air mail when transported.

12.1. How is the air cargo or air mail conveyed to the ACC3 or RA3?	
(a) Validated entity's own transport?	
YES or NO	
(b) ACC3's or RA3's transport?	
YES or NO	
(c) Contractor used by the validated entity?	
YES or NO	
12.2. Is the air cargo or air mail tamper evidently packed?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how	
12.3. Is the vehicle sealed or locked before transportation?	
YES or NO	
If YES, how	
12.4. Where numbered seals are used, is access to the seals controlled and are the numbers recorded?	
YES or NO	
If YES, specify how	
12.5. If applicable, does the respective haulier sign the haulier declaration?	
YES or NO	
12.6. Has the person transporting the cargo been subject to specific security controls and awareness training before being authorised to transport secured air cargo or air mail, or both?	
YES or NO	
If YES, please describe what kind of security controls (for example, pre-employment check, background check) and what kind of training (for example, security awareness training, etc.)	
12.7. Conclusion: Are the measures sufficient to protect air cargo or air mail from unauthorised interference during transportation?	
YES or NO	
If NO, specify reasons	
Comments from the entity	
Comments from the UK aviation security validator	

Objective: After assessing the twelve previous parts of this checklist, the UK aviation security validator has to conclude whether its on-site verification confirms the implementation of the security controls in compliance with the objectives listed in this checklist for UK bound air cargo or air mail.

Two different scenarios are possible. The UK aviation security validator concludes that the entity:

- (1) has succeeded in complying with the objectives referred to in this checklist. A validation report shall be delivered to the UK Civil Aviation Authority and to the validated entity within a maximum of one month after the on-site verification;
- (2) has failed in complying with the objectives referred to in this checklist. In that case, the entity is not authorised to deliver air cargo or mail for UK destination to an ACC3 or RA3 without it being screened by an authorised party. It shall receive a copy of the completed checklist stating the deficiencies.

The UK aviation security validator has to keep in mind that the assessment is based on an overall objective-based compliance methodology.

12.1. General conclusion: Indicate the scenario closest to the situation validated	
1 or 2	
Comments from UK aviation security validator	
Comments from the entity	

Name of the validator:

Date:

Signature:



**DECLARATION OF COMMITMENTS — UK AVIATION SECURITY VALIDATED ACC3**

On behalf of [name of air carrier] I take note of the following:

This report establishes the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo operations in respect of the security standards listed in the checklist or referred to therein.

[name of air carrier] can only be designated 'air cargo or mail carrier operating into the UK from a third country airport' (ACC3) once a UK aviation security validation report has been submitted to and accepted by the UK Department for Transport for that purpose, and the details of the ACC3 have been entered in the UK database on supply chain security.

If a non-compliance in the security measures the report refers to is identified by the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority this could lead to the withdrawal of [name of air carrier] designation as ACC3 already obtained for this airport which will prevent [name of air carrier] transport air cargo or mail into the UK area from this airport.

The report is valid for five years and shall therefore expire on ... at the latest.

On behalf of [air carrier] I declare that:

- (1) [name of air carrier] will accept appropriate follow-up action for the purpose of monitoring the standards confirmed by the report.
- (2) I will provide the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority with the relevant details promptly but at least within 15 days if:
  - (a) any changes to [name of air carrier] security programme occur;
  - (b) the overall responsibility for security is assigned to an appropriate person;
  - (c) there are any other changes to premises or procedures likely to significantly impact on security;
  - (d) the air carrier ceases trading, no longer deals with air cargo or mail bound to the UK, or can no longer meet the requirements of the relevant UK legislation that have been validated in this report.
- (3) [name of air carrier] will maintain the security level confirmed in this report as compliant with the objective set out in the checklist and, where appropriate, implement and apply any additional security measures required to be designated ACC3 where security standards were identified as insufficient, until the subsequent validation of [name of air carrier] activities.
- (4) [name of air carrier] will inform the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority in case it is not able to request, obtain or ensure the application of appropriate security controls in respect of cargo or mail it accepts for carriage into the UK area, or it cannot exercise effective oversight on its supply chain.

On behalf of [name of air carrier] I accept full responsibility for this declaration.

Name:

Position in company:

Date:

Signature:

**DECLARATION OF COMMITMENTS — THIRD COUNTRY UK AVIATION SECURITY VALIDATED  
REGULATED AGENT (RA3)**

On behalf of [name of entity] I take note of the following:

This report establishes the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo operations in respect of the security standards listed in the checklist or referred to therein.

[Name of entity] can only be designated 'third country UK aviation security validated regulated agent' (RA3) once a UK aviation security validation report has been submitted to and accepted by the UK Department for Transport for that purpose, and the details of the RA3 have been entered in the UK database on supply chain security.

If a non-compliance in the security measures the report refers to is identified by the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority this could lead to the withdrawal of [name of entity] designation as a RA3 already obtained for this premises which will prevent [name of entity] from delivering secured air cargo or mail destined for the UK to an ACC3 or another RA3.

The report is valid for three years and shall therefore expire on ... at the latest.

On behalf of [name of entity] I declare that:

- (1) [name of entity] will accept appropriate follow-up action for the purpose of monitoring the standards confirmed by the report.
- (2) I will provide the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority with the relevant details promptly but at least within 15 days if:
  - (a) any changes to [name of entity] security programme occur;
  - (b) the overall responsibility for security is assigned to an appropriate person;
  - (c) there are any other changes to premises or procedures likely to significantly impact on security;
  - (d) the company ceases trading, no longer deals with air cargo or mail bound to the UK, or can no longer meet the requirements of the relevant UK legislation that have been validated in this report.
- (3) [name of entity] will maintain the security level confirmed in this report as compliant with the objective set out in the checklist and, where appropriate, implement and apply any additional security measures required to be designated RA3 where security standards were identified as insufficient, until the subsequent validation of [name of entity] activities.
- (4) [name of entity] will inform the ACC3s and RA3s to which it delivers secured air cargo and/or air mail if [name of entity] ceases trading, no longer deals with air cargo/air mail or can no longer meet the requirements validated in this report.

On behalf of [name of entity] I accept full responsibility for this declaration.

Name:

Position in company:

Date:

Signature:

**DECLARATION OF COMMITMENTS — THIRD COUNTRY UK AVIATION SECURITY VALIDATED  
KNOWN CONSIGNOR (KC3)**

On behalf of [name of entity] I take note of the following:

This report establishes the level of security applied to UK bound air cargo operations in respect of the security standards listed in the checklist or referred to therein.

[Name of entity] can only be designated 'third country UK aviation security validated known consignor' (KC3) once a UK aviation security validation report has been submitted to and accepted by the UK Department for Transport of a for that purpose, and the details of the KC3 have been entered in the UK database on supply chain security.

If a non-compliance in the security measures the report refers to is identified by the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority, this could lead to the withdrawal of [name of entity] designation as a KC3 already obtained for this premises which will prevent [name of entity] from delivering secured air cargo or mail for UK destination to an ACC3 or an RA3.

The report is valid for three years and shall therefore expire on ... at the latest.

On behalf of [name of entity] I declare that:

- (1) [name of entity] will accept appropriate follow-up action for the purpose of monitoring the standards confirmed by the report;
- (2) I will provide the UK Department for Transport or Civil Aviation Authority with the relevant details promptly but at least within 15 days if:
  - (a) any changes to [name of entity] security programme occur;
  - (b) the overall responsibility for security is assigned to an appropriate person;
  - (c) there are any other changes to premises or procedures likely to significantly impact on security;
  - (d) the company ceases trading, no longer deals with air cargo/mail bound to the UK, or can no longer meet the requirements of the relevant UK legislation that have been validated in this report.
- (3) [name of entity] will maintain the security level confirmed in this report as compliant with the objective set out in the checklist and, where appropriate, implement and apply any additional security measures required to be designated KC3 where security standards were identified as insufficient, until the subsequent validation of [name of entity] activities.
- (4) [name of entity] will inform the ACC3s and RA3s to which it delivers secured air cargo and/or air mail if [name of entity] ceases trading, no longer deals with air cargo/air mail or can no longer meet the requirements validated in this report.

On behalf of [name of entity] I accept full responsibility for this declaration.

Name:

Position in company:

Date:

Signature:

**INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION — UK AVIATION SECURITY VALIDATOR**

- (a) I confirm that I have established the level of compliance of the validated entity in an impartial and objective way.
- (b) I confirm that I am not and have not in the preceding two years, been employed by the validated entity.
- (c) I confirm that I have no economic or other direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the validation activity, the validated entity or its affiliates.
- (d) I confirm that I have and have had in the preceding 12 months, no business relations such as training and consultancy beyond the validation process with the validated entity in areas related to aviation security.
- (e) I confirm that the UK aviation security validation report is based on a thorough evaluation of relevant security documentation, consisting of:
  - the validated entities' security programme or equivalent, and
  - an on- site verification of the implementation thereof.
- (f) I confirm that the UK aviation security validation report is based on an assessment of all security relevant areas on which the validator is required to give an opinion based on the relevant UK checklist.
- (g) I confirm that I have applied a methodology that allows for separate UK aviation security validation reports in respect of each entity validated and ensures objectivity and impartiality of the fact finding and evaluation, where several entities are being validated in a joint action.
- (h) I confirm that I accepted no financial or other benefits, other than a reasonable fee for the validation and a compensation of travel and accommodation costs.

I accept full responsibility for the UK aviation security validation report.

Name of the validated entity:

Name of the UK aviation security validator:

Date:

Signature: