

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

INCIDENT INVOLVING BOEING B737-8AS, EI-CSA, AT STANSTED AIRPORT ON 27 FEBRUARY 2002
(ENGINE FIRE CONFIRMED AFTER LANDING LED TO AIRCRAFT EVACUATION ON TAXIWAY)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F37/2004
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 11 August 2004
OPERATOR : Ryanair
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2002/01195
AAIB REPORT : Bulletin 7/2004

SYNOPSIS

(Extract from AAIB Report)

The aircraft was inbound to London Stansted from Dublin on the last of four consecutive sectors of duty for the whole crew. The first officer was undergoing line training during this sector and had been designated as Handling Pilot. The aircraft was established on final approach to Runway 23, when, shortly after lowering the landing gear, the flight and cabin crew became aware of an increased level of vibration in the aircraft. The flight deck instruments indicated that this was due to increased vibration in the No 2 engine. Although this indication was within the prescribed limit, the commander instructed the first officer, to use only idle reverse after landing.

The touchdown was normal but, shortly after touchdown, the cabin crew became aware of a smell of burning. During the landing roll, the commander took control of the aircraft, in accordance with standard operating procedures. The aircraft vacated the runway at the second 'high speed' exit.

As it passed an airfield operations vehicle, the airfield operations officer in the vehicle saw flames emitting from the rear of the aircraft's right engine. This was not visible from the Tower Visual Control Room. She advised ATC on the Tower radio frequency. Just before this conversation between the tower and the officer, the aircraft had been transferred to the GMC. The commander instructed the first officer to shut down the right engine. The GMC initiated an Aircraft Ground. By this stage the aircraft had been brought to a halt on the taxiway at Block 141, across Taxiway 'H' and heading 140°. This placed the aircraft crosswind with the right engine on the upwind side. Some of the cabin crew at the rear of the cabin were now aware of smoke outside the aircraft on the right hand side. The commander briefed the Senior Cabin Crew Member (SCCM), informing him that ATC had reported smoke coming from the right engine and that the Fire Service were on their way to investigate. The commander also briefed that, at that stage, there was no indication on the flight deck that an evacuation would be necessary. The SCCM returned to the cabin and briefed the other cabin crew members on the situation, telling them not to leave their doors. The commander briefed 'Fire One' that the aircraft had experienced vibration on the right engine, that there were no indications of a fire, but smoke had been noticed by ATC.

With the No 2 engine shut down, the commander requested the RFFS to investigate the state of the engine. When informed that aircraft had smoke billowing from number two engine, the commander briefed the SCCM on the impending evacuation, confirming that slides would be used and that the evacuation would be initiated on his command. As part of the evacuation procedure, the fire bottles were discharged into each engine. The commander ordered the passengers and crew to evacuate the aircraft, leaving the decision as to which exits were to be used to the cabin crew, in accordance with standard operating procedures. At that time the fire crew called

the aircraft saying "can you make sure you evacuate port side", which was not acknowledged. The cabin crew opened the Type I exits at the front and rear of the cabin. Passengers opened the overwing exits. Four positioning cabin crew assisted the operating cabin crew during the evacuation. About 40 passengers evacuated onto the right side of the aircraft, including six onto the right wing. This placed them in the vicinity of the right engine and the area where the fire crews were directing their fire fighting efforts. These six passengers were instructed by the fire crew to return inside the aircraft and seek an alternative exit. The passengers who evacuated on the left side used the doors. The passengers were escorted away from the aircraft into two groups, depending on which side they had evacuated. Those who had exited to the left side congregated to the east, downwind of the aircraft. This placed them in an area where smoke drifted downwind from the right engine. Those who had exited to the right side assembled to the south of the aircraft on the grass adjacent to Block 51. Coaches were dispatched from the Terminal to pick up the passengers. All passengers and crew were accounted for.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The four Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2004-50

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Air Traffic Controllers, when they are advising an aircraft on the ground of signs of fire, to include the surface wind in their notification transmission.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. A review of the instructions and advice to Air Traffic Controllers, when dealing with aircraft emergencies, with a view to including the surface wind when advising an aircraft on the ground of signs of fire, will be initiated without delay. This review is expected to be complete by mid-October and any necessary revisions or additions will be promulgated by means of an Air Traffic Services Information Notice (ATSIN) pending incorporation in the Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2004-51

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Fire Officers, when attending an aircraft fire, to ensure that they consider advising the flight crew on the best route for evacuation, as well as advising on the need to evacuate.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. A review of the instructions to Fire Officers, when attending an aircraft fire, has been conducted and appropriate instructions, to ensure that they consider advising the flight crew on the best route for evacuation, as well as advising on the need to evacuate, have been issued. In addition, Fire Training Schools have been notified of this Safety Recommendation, so that the revised instructions can be incorporated within their training courses.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2004-52

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages aerodrome operators to provide suitable video recording facilities at airports operating public transport flights in order to preserve best evidence in the event of an accident or incident.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. The CAA has carried out an initial consultation and many aerodromes already undertake video recording of selected airside activities. Through its routine publications and other appropriate means, the CAA will encourage aerodrome operators to provide or utilise existing video recording facilities to monitor as much of the movement area as possible, in order to preserve best evidence in the event of an accident or incident.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2004-53

It is recommended that the Irish Aviation Authority and JAA review the requirements for cabin crew initial and refresher training in respect of the operation of all normal and emergency exits, to ensure that crew members become, and remain, familiar with the different operating procedures, and opening characteristics, in both normal and emergency modes of operation.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

However the CAA can confirm that the JAA Operations Sectorial Team has referred this Safety Recommendation to the Flight Crew and Cabin Crew Sub Group for consideration.

CAA Status - Closed