

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

**ACCIDENT TO BN2B-26 ISLANDER, G-BOMG, 8NM WNW OF CAMPBELTOWN AIRPORT ON 15 MARCH 2005
(AIR AMBULANCE AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE SEA ON APPROACH)**

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F39/2006
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 10 November 2006
OPERATOR : Loganair
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2005/01780
AAIB REPORT : AAR 2/2006

SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

The Glasgow based Islander aircraft was engaged on an air ambulance task for the Scottish Ambulance Service when the accident occurred. The pilot allocated to the flight had not flown for 32 days; he was therefore required to complete a short flight at Glasgow to retain currency before landing to collect a paramedic for the flight to Campbeltown Airport on the Kintyre Peninsula.

Poor weather at Campbeltown Airport necessitated an instrument approach. There was neither radar nor Air Traffic Control Service at the airport, so the pilot was receiving a Flight Information Service from a Flight Information Service officer in accordance with authorised procedures. After arriving overhead Campbeltown Airport, the aircraft flew outbound on the approach procedure for Runway 11 and began a descent. The pilot next transmitted that he had completed the 'base turn', indicating that he was inbound to the airport and commencing an approach.

Nothing more was seen or heard of the aircraft and further attempts at radio contact were unsuccessful. The emergency services were alerted and an extensive search operation was mounted in an area based on the pilot's last transmission. The aircraft wreckage was subsequently located on the sea bed 7.7 nm west-north-west of the airport, there was no survivors.

The investigation identified the following causal factors:

1. The pilot allowed the aircraft to descend below the minimum altitude for the aircraft's position on the approach procedure, and this descent probably continued unchecked until the aircraft flew into the sea.
2. A combination of fatigue, workload and lack of recent flying practise probably contributed to the pilot's reduced performance.
3. The pilot may have been subject to an undetermined influence such as disorientation, distraction or a subtle incapacitation, which affected his ability to safely control the aircraft's flight path.

Three safety recommendations have been made.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The three Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2006-101

The European Aviation Safety Agency and Joint Aviation Authorities should review the UK Civil Aviation Authority's proposal to mandate the fitment of Upper Torso Restraints on all seats of existing Transport Category (Passenger) aeroplanes below 5,700 kg being operated for public transport, and consider creating regulation to implement the intent of the proposal.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2006-102

Considering the unique circumstances of air ambulance flights, the Civil Aviation Authority, in conjunction with the Joint Aviation Authorities should review the circumstances in which a second pilot is required for public transport flights operating air ambulance services.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation and will, in conjunction with the Operations Director of the JAA, review the circumstances for which a second pilot is required for public transport flights with particular emphasis on air ambulance services.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2006-103

The Civil Aviation Authority, in conjunction with the Joint Aviation Authorities, should consider mandating the carriage of a radio altimeter, or other independent low height warning device, for public transport IFR flights operating with a single pilot.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation and will, in conjunction with the Operations Director of the JAA, consider mandating the carriage of a radio altimeter for single pilot, public transport, IFR flights.

CAA Status - Open